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Abstract
As deep networks are applied to an ever-expanding set
of computer vision tasks, protecting general privacy in im-
age data has become a critically important goal. This pa-
per presents a new framework for privacy-preserving data
sharing that is robust to adversarial attacks and overcomes
the known issues existing in previous approaches. We in-
troduce the concept of a Deep Poisoning Function (DPF),
which is a module inserted into a pre-trained deep network
designed to perform a specific vision task. The DPF is op-
timized to deliberately poison image data to prevent known
adversarial attacks, while ensuring that the altered image
data is functionally equivalent to the non-poisoned data for
the original task. Given this equivalence, both poisoned
and non-poisoned data can be used for further retraining
or fine-tuning. Experimental results on image classification
and face recognition tasks prove the efficacy of the proposed
method.
1. Introduction
Deep networks have achieved state-of-the-art results on
many computer vision tasks [12, 13, 18, 24, 26, 38, 39],
which can be used in many critical production systems [3,
7, 25]. Traditionally, training of these networks requires
task-specific datasets with many images, but sharing these
datasets for common benchmarking may be inappropriate
since they may contain sensitive or private information. For
instance, most individuals would not want their faces shared
in publicly-released datasets [11, 34], especially without
their explicit consent. To enable the sharing of image data
containing sensitive content, recent proposals include pre-
serving privacy through algorithms [22, 42] or gathering the
explicit consent of individuals that appear in the dataset [5].
Although individuals may consent to appear in a dataset,
sensitive information can still be inadvertently disclosed in
a set of images, and an extra layer of security could help
to reduce this potential for harm. Methods have been de-
veloped to protecting content within visual data, including
convolutional
features
poisoned
convolutional features
Figure 1. Using a DPF to protect intermediate convolutional fea-
tures. These ”poisoned” features cannot be used to reconstruct im-
ages, but remain functionally equivalent to non-poisoned features
for a given target task, such as image classification.
image obfuscation and perturbation [22, 28, 36], which re-
duces or removes sensitive information by altering the im-
ages themselves. Because Convolutional Neural Networks
(CNNs) are widely used in image-related tasks, another
strategy is to release intermediate, convolutional features
generated during the forward pass over an image (a pro-
cess called image featurization) [31, 32]. Then, as opposed
to training over image-label pairs, one can train a model
on feature-label pairs, and unlike images, the original im-
age content is usually not immediately apparent when visu-
alizing these features. Unfortunately, both obfuscated im-
ages and featurized images are vulnerable to reconstruc-
tion [27, 28] or other types of attacks [19], where the orig-
inal image content may be revealed from the obfuscated
data. To counter this, recent adversarial developments at-
tempt to explicitly train an obfuscator to defend against such
a reconstruction attack [17, 19, 30, 37, 40, 44, 47, 50].
This paper focuses on methods for the general preven-
tion of potential attacks on publicly-released convolutional
features, so that image data can be shared for a particular
vision task without leaking sensitive or private information.
We denote the given task that the features are designed for
1
(such as classification) as the target task and the potential
attack (such as reconstruction) as the byproduct attack. For
example, when convolutional features of images are pub-
licly shared for training image classification models, the
image reconstruction restores the original images and can
reveal content meant to be kept private.
To achieve this, our first contribution is a training
regime designed to prevent the convolutional features from
a byproduct attack with a minimal loss in original target task
performance. As shown in Fig.1, this is accomplished with
a module denoted as the Deep Poisoning Function (DPF).
Specifically, we split a pre-trained task-specific model at
a given point, and use certain starting layers of the model
as a featurizer to produce convolutional features, similar
to [31, 32]. Then, a straw man network can be trained on
the convolutional features as a representation of a byprod-
uct attack. For instance, an image reconstructor is trained
to restore images from their feature representation. After-
wards, a DPF is trained to disrupt the convolutional features
such that the byproduct attack performance suffers, while
the target task is well preserved. The DPF is optimized by
jointly maximizing the target task objective and minimiz-
ing the byproduct objective. Therefore, the raw images can
be first featurized and then poisoned to generate poisoned
convolutional features for privacy-safe sharing.
Our second contribution is a partial release strategy that
prevent the poisoned convolutional features from the sec-
ondary attack. Since the target-task-related information and
the byproduct-related information may not be mutually ex-
clusive, we must assume that neither our proposed DPF
nor existing approaches can completely remove byproduct-
related information from convolutional features learned for
the target task. In order to allow new images to be used
alongside the released convolutional features, previous ad-
versarial approaches [17, 19, 30, 37, 40, 44, 47, 50] re-
quire the release of their obfuscation method, which makes
training a byproduct attack model on top of the obfusca-
tor straightforward, denoted as a secondary attack in this
paper. Instead, our proposed DPF makes the poisoned fea-
tures nearly indistinguishable from the original ones from
the target task’s perspective (target-task equivalence), but
unusable for the byproduct attack. Therefore, the trained
DPF can remain private, which removes the potential for a
secondary byproduct attack (more details in Sec. 3.2.3).
Finally, we conducted experiments to verify that the pro-
posed DPF can prevent a byproduct attack on the convo-
lutional features with a minimal loss in target task perfor-
mance. Furthermore, even though the DPF is trained on
only one pre-trained straw man network, it can also prevent
other byproduct attack models trained on the same convolu-
tional features but unknown during its training. Our experi-
ments demonstrate that the proposed DPF framework is an
effective way to share image data in a privacy-safe manner.
2. Related Work
Recent effort on preserving data privacy includes
privacy-preserving data publishing (PPDP) [6, 52] and
privacy-preserving visual tasks. PPDP collects a set of in-
dividual records and publishes the records for further data
mining [1, 23, 29, 35, 46], without disclosing individual at-
tributes such as gender, disease, or salary. Existing work
on PPDP mainly focuses on anonymization [4, 10, 49] and
data slicing [20]. While PPDP usually handles individual
records related to identification, it is not expliclty-designed
for general high-dimensional data, such as images.
Other recent work has attempted to specifically pre-
serve privacy in images and videos. De-identification meth-
ods [21, 45] partially alter images, for example by obfuscat-
ing faces. However, these approaches are designed specif-
ically for anonymization and may limit the re-usability of
the data for a given target task. Encryption-based ap-
proaches [8, 16, 53] train models directly on encrypted
data, but this prevents general dataset release, as special-
ized models are required. An alternative approach is to use
super low-resolution images in order to avoid leaking sen-
sitive information. Optimal transformations for producing
these low-resolution images or videos are learned in [42].
Most recent approaches to protect sensitive content in
image data are usually obfuscation-based. Some examples
include intuitive perturbations, such as blurring and block-
ing, which impair the usability of the image data [22], or
reversible perturbations due to rich visual information [27,
28]. Inspired by Generative Adversarial Nets (GAN) [9],
adversarial approaches [17, 19, 30, 37, 40, 44, 47, 50] learn
deep obfuscators for images or corresponding convolutional
features. However, to ensure the re-usability of the learned
models, the learned obfuscators need to be released along
with the image data. Thus, the obfuscated images or convo-
lutional features are still vulnerable to a secondary byprod-
uct attack, as an attack model can be trained on the top of
the obfuscator.
3. Proposed Framework
In this section, we use image classification as an exam-
ple of the target task and image reconstruction as a potential
byproduct attack. Our proposedmethod aims to learn a DPF
from the images to be shared and transform them into con-
volutional representations with two objectives: 1) the repre-
sentation must contain the requisite information needed to
train image classification models; 2) image reconstruction
from the representation is not possible.
3.1. Initial Training
3.1.1 Target Task: Classification
Suppose we have an image classification task that we wish
to make public, and in a privacy-safe manner, specifically
classification
reconstruction
(a)
(b)
φ1 φ2
ψ
convolutional
features
Figure 2. Initial training: (a) CNN model learned for image clas-
sification produces intermediate convolutional features; (b) Ex-
tracted convolutional features are used for image reconstruction.
by releasing both a set of convolutional features (instead
of raw images), and a model that can create similar fea-
tures from other images and predict labels given convolu-
tional features as input. One reason for designing such a
framework is to avoid having to release an image dataset
that may contain sensitive information, while still allowing
others to use and potentially retrain models that are trained
on this data. Denote the collected and annotated image set
as S = {x1, x2, ..., xn}. According to existing state-of-the-
art CNN architectures such as VGGNet [43], ResNet [13],
ResNeXt [51] or DenseNet [15], an initial classification
model Φ can be learned to predict image labels prior to re-
lease. A standard cross entropy loss function can be adopted
for optimization of this target task,
LT (x, yi) = − log
(
ep(Φ(x)=yi)
)
/
∑
j
ep(Φ(x)=yj), (1)
where yi represents the annotation of the image x ∈ S. As
illustrated in Fig.2(a), for our specific application we split
the pre-trained image classification model into two sequen-
tial modules by setting a hook point: the featurizer ϕ1 con-
sists of certain starting layers of the architecture until the
hook point, while the classifier ϕ2 contains the remaining
layers after the hook point.
Φ(x) = ϕ2(ϕ1(x)). (2)
We denote the parameters of the pre-trained image classifi-
cation model as θΦ = {θϕ1, θϕ2}.
Based on the pre-trained featurizer, we extract a feature
bank ϕ1(S). We then release the feature bank ϕ1(S) and the
pre-trainedmodelΦ. Afterwards, the image set S is deleted.
Because the original featurizer is released, others can create
new convolutional features, and use the classifier to classify
their own images (or even finetune it on some other dataset).
Figure 3. Various information contained in convolutional features.
3.1.2 Byproduct Attack: Reconstruction
Even though the convolutional features in ϕ1(S) may not
visually depict the image content, adversaries can still eas-
ily convert them to the original images by training an im-
age reconstructor. To simulate this byproduct attack, we
learn a straw man reconstructor ψ. Since we do not release
the image set S publicly, the adversaries need to use some
other data, such as another public image dataset Q to train
the reconstruction model. For z ∈ Q, we can train ψ by
minimizing the difference (e.g. L1 loss) between the orig-
inal image z and the reconstructed image zˆ = ψ(ϕ1(z)),
as shown in Fig.2(b). Thus, the reconstructor ψ learns to
reverse the general featurization process, and because it can
also reconstruct the image set S from the released feature
bank ϕ1(S), this type of attack nullifies the original attempt
at enforcing privacy via featurization.
3.2. Deep Poisoning
To defend against the byproduct attack of reconstruct-
ing original images from the convolutional features, we pro-
pose a framework that applies a deep poisoning function to
the convolutional features prior to release. Furthermore, we
propose a partial release strategy to defend against a sec-
ondary byproduct attack, which learns to reconstruct poi-
soned convolutional features.
3.2.1 Motivation
Based on the fact that the same convolutional features for
an input image x can be used for different applications, we
hypothesize that various visual information (denoted as U)
is preserved by the convolutional features ϕ1(x). For exam-
ple, convolutional features ϕ1(x) may contain information
both pertinent to image classification C and image recon-
structionR, as shown in Fig.3.
In order to prune the information necessary for a byprod-
uct attack from the convolutional features while preserving
the information needed for the target task, we learn a DPF
denoted as P . Conceptually, P is learned by optimizing
argmax
θP
C + argmin
θP
(R− C) + ∆, (3)
∆ ⊂ U − (C ∪ R), (4)
where ∆ indicates the visual information not related to ei-
ther task.
 1. before data release
φ1
φ2
ψ
φ3
φ1
φ4
or
LT
LB
2. training new models (optional)
3. inference (testing)
Figure 4. Poisoning convolutional features for image data release
(red box): training the deep poisoning function on the image data
and use it to poison the data for release. The following use cases
(green box) of the shared data and pre-trained models.
3.2.2 Deep Poisoning Function
In this classification example, there are two goals that the
proposed DPF is designed to achieve (and defined below):
classification equivalence and reconstruction disparity. If
the poisoned convolutional features are equivalent to non-
poisoned features from the perspective of the classifier, the
poisoned features P (ϕ1(S)) can be used in conjuction with
features constructed from other images collected for the
same task, as the featurizer is publicly available. The poi-
soned features themselves can be safely released because
they were specifically altered to maximize the reconstruc-
tion disparity. More importantly, the obfuscating DPF can
also remain private. For other tasks, such as preventing face
identification in convolutional features, these goals may
vary accordingly.
Classification Equivalence The poisoning function P is
defined as an extra module inserted into the pre-trained im-
age classification model Φ, between the featurizer ϕ1 and
the classifier ϕ2. As shown in Eq.5, we require that the poi-
soned convolutional features perform equivalently for im-
age classification when compared to the original convolu-
tional features.
ϕ2(P (ϕ1(x))) = ϕ2(ϕ1(x)), P (ϕ1(x)) 6= ϕ1(x). (5)
To achieve this goal, we fix the parameters of the image
classification model, θϕ1 and θϕ2, and learn the poison-
ing function parameters θP by minimizing the classification
loss in Eq.1.
Reconstruction Disparity Meanwhile, to reduce the re-
construction information in the convolutional features, we
train the poisoning function to make the reconstructed
images from the poisoned convolutional features dissim-
ilar to the original images (in general the inverse of the
byproduct-attack objective). We also fix the parameters of
the pre-trained (or strawman) reconstructor during this step.
Specifically, we train the DPF to ensure ψ(P (ϕ1(S))) ≁ S.
To achieve this, we utilize the Structural Similarity Index
Measure (SSIM) [14, 48] to quantify the reconstruction dis-
parity, and SSIM(·, ·) between two images as the loss
function to optimize the poisoning function. Minimizing
the SSIM decreases the similarity between two images:
LB = SSIM(ψ(P (ϕ1(x))), x), x ∈ S. (6)
As shown in the red box of Fig.4, the deep poisoning
function is learned by jointlyminimizing two loss functions.
To be specific, the target function in Eq.3 would be formu-
lated as
θP = argmin
θP
LT + λ argmin
θP
LB , (7)
where the λ is a hyper-parameter to balance two target func-
tions. Note that the θϕ1, θϕ2 and θψ are pre-trained and
remain constant during poisoning function training. In ad-
dition, this objective can be easily expanded to cover other
byproduct or target tasks.
3.2.3 Partial Release Strategy
As shown in Fig.3, we assume that the classification-related
information and the reconstruction-related information are
not mutually exclusive. Therefore, both the proposed
DPF and existing adversarial methods can not completely
eliminate reconstruction-related information while retain-
ing adequate information for image classification. With
the residual reconstruction-related information in the obfus-
cated [19, 30, 37, 40, 44, 47, 50] or poisoned convolutional
features, the secondary reconstructor can be further trained
to restore the original images.
For example, while existing obfuscators, such as Deep-
Obfuscator [19] (denoted as O), need to be released along
with the obfuscated convolutional features to ensure the re-
usability of the shared data, adversaries can infer obfuscated
features using public images, e.g. z ∈ Q. With the pairs
{z ∈ Q, O(z)}, a secondary reconstructor can be trained
to restore the original images from the obfuscated convo-
lutional features, even though the initial reconstruction is
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 5. (a) raw image; (b) reconstruction from the non-
obfuscated features; (c) reconstruction from obfuscated features
by the reconstructor used in (b); (d) reconstruction from obfus-
cated features by a secondary reconstructor.
prevented, as shown in Fig.5. To address this issue, when
sharing the poisoned image data, we release the pre-trained
featurizer ϕ1, classifier ϕ2 and the poisoned convolutional
features P (ϕ1(S)), and keep the learned deep poisoning
function P as well as S in private (raw images and their
original convolutional features are not shared).
During the poisoning function training, the parameters
of the featurizer ϕ1 and the classifier ϕ2 are fixed to enforce
the classification equivalence in Eq.5. Therefore, the poi-
soned convolutional features perform similarly to the non-
poisoned ones for a specific classifier ϕ2. If this is the case,
we can infer that the classification-related information pre-
served in the poisoned features is approximate to that in the
original features, ensuring that the poisoned features can be
reused. For example, as shown in green box of Fig.4, new
classifiers, e.g. ϕ3, can be trained on the poisoned convolu-
tional features, and new images (denoted as T), which have
not been used for training classifiers, can be featurized as
ϕ1(T) and combined with P (ϕ1(S)) to refine or train clas-
sifiers, e.g. ϕ2, ϕ4. This removes the need to release the
DPF publicly.
By keeping the poisoning function in private, adversaries
can not get pairs of image and corresponding poisoned fea-
tures: specifically, 1) {x ∈ S, P (ϕ1(x))}, images in S are
not shared; 2) {z ∈ Q, P (ϕ1(z))}, poisoned features for
images in Q can not be inferred with lacking of P . Without
pairs of poisoned convolutional features and ground truth,
secondary reconstructors can not be trained to attack the
poisoned features, and reconstructors trained on the original
featuresϕ1(z) have already been disrupted by the poisoning
function.
4. Experiments
We conduct experiments to demonstrate that the pro-
posed deep poisoning function can prevent a reconstruction
byproduct attack on the target-task convolutional features.
The first experiment is performed within an image classi-
fication framework, while the second shows qualitative re-
sults on a task designed to prevent face identification in poi-
soned features.
Backbone Acc. Metric (%)
Convolutional Features
Original Poisoned
ResNet50
top-1 79.39 78.88
top-5 94.18 94.11
ResNet101
top-1 81.13 80.78
top-5 95.03 94.86
Table 1. Image classification results based on the original and poi-
soned convolutional features by the pre-trained classifier.
4.1. Classification Experiment Configurations
To begin, we use the ImageNet dataset [41] for the target
task of image classification, and we require that the visual
information within the convolutional features is decimated
such that images reconstructed from poisoned features are
illegible from a perceptual standpoint. The dataset is split
into two sets, simulating a private image set, which contains
sensitive information and should not be shared directly, and
a public image set. The private set S contains images from a
randomly selected subset of 500 ImageNet categories, while
the public set Q contains the remaining images. Both S and
Q contain training and validation subsets, which are further
split among categories. Due to its general applicability for
computer vision tasks, we adopt a ResNet [13] architecture
as the backbone network. Following the expressions in Ta-
ble 1 of [13], we use conv[·] [·] to represent the hook point
that splits the architecture into the featurizer and the clas-
sifier. For example, conv4 1 indicates that the featurizer
consists of the layers from the start of the architecture until
the first building block of layer4 in the ResNet architecture.
4.2. Proof of Concept
Similar to Fig.2, we train the initial image classification
models, a ResNet50 and a ResNet101, on the training sub-
set of S. The top-1 and top-5 precision for the 500-category
recognition (on the validation subset of S) achieved by the
ResNet50 are 79.39% and 94.18%, respectively, while that
achieved by the ResNet101 are 81.13% and 95.03%, respec-
tively, as shown in the third column of Table 1.
Initially we set the hook point to conv4 1 for both mod-
els. Given an input image with dimension 224 × 224,
the featurizer extracted from each model produces convo-
lutional features with dimension 14 × 14. To simulate an
attack from an adversary, we use the featurizer to infer con-
volutional features for images in image set Q. Then, an
image reconstructor ψ can be trained to reverse the corre-
sponding featurizer. The reconstructor architecture contains
2 inverse bottleneck blocks (CONV1×1 – BN – CONV3×3
– BN – CONV1 × 1 – ReLU), reversing the ResNet bottle-
neck blocks [13], before upscaling the spatial dimension by
a factor of 2. After several upscaling stacks, a CONV1×1 –
BN – ReLU – CONV1×1module is appended to format the
DPFw/o poisoningraw images w/o poisoning DPF
(a) (b) ResNet50 (c) ResNet101
Figure 6. Comparisons of image reconstruction from the original
convolutional features (second and fourth rows) and the poisoned
convolutional features (third and fifth rows).
final output to the same dimension with the input image. A
min-max normalization is utilized to limit the range of the
final output to [0, 1], which is consistent with the input im-
age range. After training, the reconstructor can restore the
original images from convolutional features generated for
images in both S and Q. We use both the L1 distance and
SSIM between the reconstructed images and the original
images to quantify the reconstruction quality. As shown in
the second and fourth columns of Table 2, the reconstructed
images are highly similar to the original images.
Next, a DPF is inserted to disrupt the reconstruction-
related information in the convolutional features originally
learned for image classification. The DPF consists of 4
residual blocks, which are equivalent to the bottleneck
blocks in the ResNet architecture [13], and it produces poi-
soned convolutional features with the same dimension as its
input. Training of the deep poisoning function is conducted
on the image set S (training subset) by optimizing the target
function in Eq.7. The parameters in the pre-trained featur-
izer, classifier and reconstructor are all fixed during DPF
training, and the hyper-parameter λ is set to 1.0.
As shown in the last column of Table 1, the classifica-
tion performance based on the poisoned convolutional fea-
conv4 1
L1 Distance (↑) SSIM (↓)
Original Poisoned Original Poisoned
ResNet50 0.0443 0.2928 0.6730 0.0070
ResNet101 0.0406 0.2886 0.7009 0.0069
Table 2. Reconstruction results with and without poisoning.
(a)
(b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g)
(b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g)
(a)
Figure 7. Reconstruction results from the original (left columns)
and poisoned (right columns) convolutional features by recon-
structors: (b) px2s2, (c) px4s2, (d) rx2s2, (e) rx4s2, (f) rx4s4
and (g) rx2s2 c. (a): raw images.
tures are quite close to that based on the original convolu-
tional features. Meanwhile, the similarity between the re-
constructed images and the original images is significantly
reduced by the DPF, as shown in Table 2 (the third and fifth
columns). We also show the visual comparison between
the reconstructed images created from the original convolu-
tional features and the poisoned convolutional features, re-
spectively, via the pre-trained reconstructor in Fig.6. These
results demonstrate that the proposed poisoning function
can learn to preserve the classification-related information
and suppress the reconstruction-related information in the
convolutional features.
4.3. Ablation Analysis
Beyond this initial proof of concept, we conduct an abla-
tion study to understand the proposed framework in-depth.
Various Reconstructors: The proposed DPF is learned
based on a pre-trained image reconstructor and defends this
specific reconstructor effectively as shown in Fig.6. How-
ever, as its name implies, this straw man network is an easy
objective to optimize against, and in practice, there may be
different adversaries designing multiple networks to recon-
struct convolutional features. To verify that the proposed
DPF can also defend the image reconstruction from differ-
ent reconstructors (which have never been observed during
the DPF training) we train five reconstructors for the same
featurizer, conv4 1 (ResNet101), based on different archi-
tectures. We denote the reconstructor used for DPF train-
ing as px2s2, where p indicates the type of blocks used
for building the reconstructor – in this case, a plain inverse
bottleneck block without residual operation, with x2 rep-
raw
images
w/o
poisoning
GN GF MF DPF GN+DPF GF+DPF MF+DPF
Figure 8. Comparison of reconstruction results from different poisoning functions.
resenting two blocks before upscaling, and s2 representing
that the upscaling factor is 2. Similarly, other reconstruc-
tors unknown to DPF training are denoted as px4s2, rx2s2,
rx4s2, rx4s4 and rx2s2 c, where r indicates inverse resid-
ual bottleneck blocks, and cmeans the normalization strat-
egy during reconstructor training is clamp instead of min-
max normalization. These reconstructors are learned from
the image set Q by following similar training procedures
for training px2s2. We feed the features produced by ϕ1
and their corresponding poisoned features created with P
to each of the above reconstructors, and show the recon-
struction results in Fig.7. The comparisons indicate that the
learned DPF can defend the reconstructors that have never
been observed during its training.
Stationary v.s. Deep Poisoning Functions: The pro-
posed DPF is learned, which means that it is possible to
simultaneously ensure classification equivalence and recon-
struction disparity. To justify a trained function, we com-
pare it to unlearned perturbation methods, defined as sta-
tionary poisoning functions (SPFs), such as Gaussian or
mean filters (GF, MF), or additive Gaussian noise (GN).
By replacing the DPF with an SPF based on the proposed
framework in Fig.4 (red box), the reconstruction-related in-
formation in the convolutional features is still suppressed,
but the classification-related information is also seriously
impaired. For example, as shown in Table 3, when a
Gaussian filter is applied to the convolutional features, im-
age reconstruction is prevented – the L1 distance increases
from 0.0406 to 0.1055 and SSIM decreases from 0.7099 to
0.4699. However, the classification performance is also di-
minished, as the top-1 precision drops from 81.13% to an
unacceptably-low 15.60%.
Then, we combine the proposed DPF with the SPF to
poison the convolutional features – an SPF is applied on the
top of the featurizer, prior to the DPF. As shown in Table 3,
combining an SPF and a DPF better prevents image recon-
struction at the loss of some classification accuracy.
Featurizer Depth: The previous experiments are con-
ducted based on setting the hook point to conv4 1 of
ResNet architectures. Given an image classification model,
different hook points result in different featurizers. When
an early hook point is selected, the featurizer (with a rela-
tively shallow depth) produces convolutional features that
preserve more visual details of the input image. To ex-
plore the influence of featurizer depth, we learn an indi-
vidual reconstructor and a DPF for hook points that are set
at varying depths of the given ResNet. Specifically, we test
hook points at conv2 1, conv2 3, conv3 1, conv4 1 for a
ResNet101. For an input image with size 224 × 224, the
Poisoning
classification (%) reconstruction
top-1 top-5 L1 SSIM
w/o 81.13 95.03 0.0406 0.7009
GN 25.47 45.99 0.1905 0.2635
GF 15.60 30.24 0.1055 0.4699
MF 4.44 10.78 0.1169 0.4334
DPF 80.78 94.86 0.2886 0.0069
GN+DPF 78.10 93.64 0.3339 0.0047
GF+DPF 78.77 93.78 0.3450 0.0041
MF+DPF 71.23 89.96 0.3564 0.0186
Table 3. Comparison of results from SPF, DPF and combinations
of them.
original DPF o  DPF 	
 DPF  DPFiff
(fifl
ffi !"#v2_1 (c) conv2_3 (d) conv3_1 (e) conv4_1
Figure 9. Reconstruction results from convolutional features produced by featurizers with different depths.
(a) (b) (c)(a) (b) (c)
Figure 10. Columns (a) depict the original faces; columns (b) the
reconstruction from the original convolutional features; columns
(c) the reconstruction from the poisoned features. Individually-
identifying features are automatically removed from the poisoned
convolutional features by the DPF.
convolutional features produced by the featurizers ending
at these hook points have dimensions of 56 × 56, 56 × 56,
28 × 28, and 14 × 14, respectively. The quantitative and
qualitative results in Table 4 and Fig.9 verify that varying
the hook point gives a slight tradeoff between classification
accuracy and reconstruction disparity, while still achieving
consistent poisoning results.
Classification Reconstruction
top-1 top-5 L1 SSIM
raw image 81.13 95.04 – –
conv2 1 80.96 95.04 0.0251/0.3982 0.8562/0.0124
conv2 3 81.02 94.97 0.0252/0.3688 0.8499/0.0151
conv3 1 80.91 94.86 0.0299/0.2204 0.8048/0.0097
conv4 1 80.78 94.86 0.0406/0.2886 0.7009/0.0069
Table 4. Results of DPF on different featurizer depths.. Recon-
struction values: left – from features without poisoning; right –
from the poisoned features.
4.4. Preventing Face Identification
Finally, to further analyze the generalizability of DPFs to
protect against other forms of byproduct attacks, we study
how well a poisoning function inserted into a regression
model can defend against face identification trained on the
convolutional features. We train a ResNet18 model to pre-
dict the pose (roll, pitch, and yaw) of an aligned input face
taken from the VGGFace2 dataset [2]. Then for the byprod-
uct attack, we train another face-identification ResNet18
model on the convolutional features produced at hook point
conv4 1, using 500 randomly selected identities as target
classes, similar to the pre-training step in [33]. Instead of di-
rectly optimizing the DPF with−LB , we set the target label
for the face classification network to a random value, thus
producing poisoned features that “confuse” the face identifi-
cation network. We also train a reconstruction model on the
original features in order to visualize the effects of feature
poisoning. Note that this network is not used when train-
ing the DPF. The reconstruction results in Fig.10 verify that
DPF poisons the convolutional features for face identifica-
tion.
5. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we introduce the concept of a Deep Poi-
soning Function (DPF) that, when applied to convolutional
features learned for a specific target vision task, enables the
privacy-safe sharing of image data. The proposed DPF poi-
sons convolutional features to disrupt byproduct-related in-
formation, while remaining functionally equivalent to the
original convolutional features when used for the target
task. Our partial release strategy further ensures that the
shared convolutional features cannot be reconstructed by a
secondary attack on a released obfuscation function. Fi-
nally, our experiments demonstrate that the proposed frame-
work is effective in protecting privacy in publicly-released
image data.
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